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INTRODUCTION  
Given the importance of access to medicines to human rights and well-
being in Kenya, it is appropriate to analyze whether Kenya has currently 
incorporated the allowed public health flexibilities to the greatest extent 
possible in its draft Intellectual Property Bill, 2020.2  This analysis will focus 
on the patent, utility model, and enforcement measures only as they are the 
ones directly relevant to access to medicines and other health technologies.  
The analysis starts with the premise that Kenya wishes to avoid granting 
unwarranted patents on unworthy inventions, especially with respect to 
medicines and other health technologies.  In particular, the assumption is that 
Kenya wishes to avoid granting secondary patents or minor variations to 
known medicines and medical technologies which have the sole effect of 
extending patent monopolies and preventing local generic production or 
importation.  It is assumed that Kenya wants to have a patent regime that 
prevents granting patents on new medical uses of medicines and on new 
formulation and dosages. In a word, the analysis assumes that Kenya wants 
to avoid evergreening.  It assumes instead that Kenya wants to maximize 
TRIPS-compliant policy space to minimize unneeded patent barriers and 
                                                 
*  Northeastern University School of Law; Honorary Research Fellow University of KwaZulu Natal 
(South Africa); Senior Policy Analyst, Health Global Access Project. 
2 The Kenyan Parliament revised its  Industrial Property Act in 2001 and it came into force in May 
2002.  The Act has subsequently been amended in 2002 (Act No. 2 of 2002) and 2007 (Act No. 7 of 
2007).  The Act is available at: 
http://www.kenyalaw.org:8181/exist/kenyalex/actview.xql?actid=CAP.%20509. Kenya has now 
proposed to recodify its intellectual property law in a single bill, the Intellectual Property Bill, 2020, 




3 Critique of Kenya’s Intellectual Property Bill, 2020  
further to bypass patents to advance its public health and public interest 
needs. Finally it assumes that Kenya further desires to expand policy space 
that would allow growth of domestic and regional pharmaceutical capacity. 
In crafting these recommendations, the author has relied extensively on 
EAC3 and COMESA4 recommendations that adoption and use of TRIPS-
flexibilities be maximized, on academic and think-tank commentary, and on 
best practices from countries that have adopted and successfully used TRIPS 
flexibilities.5  The paper also draws on the positive example of India, which 
has adopted the vast majority of recommended TRIPS-compliant public 
health flexibilities. 
In sum, there are many positives in the proposed Kenyan Intellectual 
Property Bill, 2020, that have at least partially incorporated desired 
flexibilities but there are important gaps and omissions as well.  On the plus 
side, the Bill incorporates several important TRIPS public-health flexibilities, 
including parallel importation and the right to issue government use and 
compulsory licenses.  The Bill also incorporates a research exception and 
promotes close regulation of anti-competitive provisions in voluntary 
licenses. Also on the plus side, the Bill has updated the 2001 Act to adopt 
                                                 
3 East African Community, REGIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY ON THE UTILIZATION OF PUBLIC 
HEALTH-RELATED WTO-TRIPS FLEXIBILITIES AND THE APPROXIMATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LEGISLATION (2013) [EAC REGIONAL IP POLICY]. 
4 COMESA, Recommendations of the Workshop on Public Health and Access to Life-saving 




TRIPS Flexibilities  
1. COMESA Secretariat in collaboration with other relevant organizations to assist 
Member States to implement the COMESA IPR Policy by developing/updating national 
IPR policies, laws and regulations by taking into account the use of flexibilities provided 
for in the TRIPS Agreement.  
2. COMESA LDCs and WTO Members to use the flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement by 
ensuring investment promotion and protection for local production of pharmaceuticals.  
3. COMESA Member States that are negotiating accession to the WTO to ensure that they 
benefit from the TRIPS flexibilities on Public Health and access to life-saving medicines 
available to existing Members of the WTO in their category. COMESA Member States 
that are already Members of the WTO to support those applying for accession.  
4. Member States to support the extension of the period of TRIPS flexibilities as long as 
production in the region remains at low levels and does not meet the demand of the 
majority of the population.  
5 This analysis is informed by UNDP, GOOD PRACTICE GUIDE:  IMPROVING ACCESS TO TREATMENT BY 
UTILIZING PUBLIC HEALTH FLEXIBILITIES IN THE WTO TRIPS AGREEMENT (2010) (UNDP GOOD 
PRACTICE GUIDE); UNDP, USING LAW TO ACCELERATE TREATMENT ACCESS IN SOUTH AFRICA:  AN 
ANALYSIS OF PATENT, COMPETITION, AND MEDICINES LAW (2013) [UNDP SA REVIEW]; Carlos Correa, 
INTEGRATING PUBLIC HEALTH CONCERNS INTO PATENT LEGISLATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2000) 
(Correa, INTEGRATING PUBLIC HEALTH); Carlos Correa, GUIDELINES FOR THE EXAMINATION OF 
PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS:  DEVELOPING A PUBLIC HEALTH PERSPECTIVE, WHO-ICTSC-UNCTAD 
(2007) (Correa, GUIDELINES FOR EXAMINATION); Carlos Correa, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
COMPETITION LAW:  EXPLORING SOME ISSUES OF RELEVANCE TO DEVELOPING Countries (2007) (Correa, 
IP AND COMPETITION LAW; Carlos M. Correa, PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION, INCREMENTAL PATENTING 
AND COMPULSORY LICENSING, SOUTH CENTRE RESEARCH PAPER 41 (2011) (Correa, PHARMACEUTICAL 
INNOVATION); and on legislation and regulations from India, the Philippines, Argentina, and Zanzibar.  
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more rigorous standards of patentability and disclosure, including additional 
exclusions from patentability for new methods of using and new uses of 
existing medicines and required disclosures to include the best method for 
practicing the invention.  However, the proposed Bill could still include even 
higher standards of patentability, more exceptions to exclusive patent rights, 
and strong pre- and post-grant opposition procedures. It could also make it 
easier to issue government use and compulsory licenses and broaden even 
further the grounds for doing.  Finally, it should also ensure that utility 
models do not cover medicines or other medical technologies. 
 
ANALYSIS OF KEY PROVISIONS 
I. Exclusions from patentability 
Article 47 of the Bill describes the meaning of inventions and excludes 
certain subject matter as non-patentable.  Although Article 47 does not 
exclude patents on plants and animals, Article 52(a) does: “The following 
shall not be patentable: (a) plant varieties as provided for in the Seeds and 
Plant Varieties Act (Cap. 326), but not parts thereof or products of 
biotechnological process… .”  Unfortunately this exclusion is incomplete in 
terms of what is permitted by Article 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement in that it 
allows patents on animals and parts of plants, including presumably seeds, 
and it fails to exclude patents on genes and other isolates of naturally 
occurring substances.  This later omission could block access to some gene-
based medical technologies, particularly certain forms of diagnostic testing; 
it could also block access to medicines extracted from or duplicating naturally 
occurring substances.  The EAC recommends that there be an explicit 
exclusion for “Natural substances including micro-organisms, even if 
purified or otherwise isolated from nature.”6 
Proposed Article 47(3)(e) is a very aggressive provision excluding patent 
protection for “public health related methods of use or uses of any molecule 
or other substances whatsoever used for the prevention or treatment of any 
disease which the Cabinet Secretary responsibility for matters relating to 
Health may designate as a serious health hazard or as a life-threatening 
disease.”  This important provision allows the Minister of Health to exclude 
patents on methods of use or uses of certain medicines entirely from patent 
protection on compelling public health grounds.  Some authors have 
strenuously defended the TRIPS-compatibility of this provision.7   
In addition to this exclusion, Kenya could make use of other public health 
exclusions like the ones used in Section 3(d) of the India Patents Act, “the 
                                                 
6 EAC REGIONAL IP POLICY, Policy Statement No. 3(a)(i), at 13. 
7 Robert Lewis-Lettington & Peter Munyi, WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY TO USE TRIPS FLEXIBILITIES: 





5 Critique of Kenya’s Intellectual Property Bill, 2020  
mere discovery of a new form of a known substance which does not result 
in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance or the mere 
discovery of any new property or new use for a known substance or the 
mere use of a known process, machine or apparatus unless such known 
process results in a new product or employs at least one new reactant” is not 
an invention.  With respect to the new-form exclusion, Indian Supreme Court 
has interpreted enhanced efficacy to require proof of significantly increased 
therapeutic efficacy not simply better physical property or even increased 
bioavailability alone.8  The EAC has recommended adoption of this 
exclusion.9  Kenya could also adopt India-style exclusions on combinations 
and admixtures of know substances (see section 3(e) of the India Patents Act). 
II. Standards of patentability 
Article 48 defines standards of patentability in TRIPS-standard terms “An 
invention is patentable if it is new, involves and inventive step, is industrially 
applicable” but fortunately drops ill-advised patents on “new uses”, a 
provision in the 2001 Act as amended.  Granting patents on new uses of 
medicines is highly undesirable and is not required by TRIPS.  Indeed, a new 
use is more in the nature of an idea than an actual new industrial application.  
The EAC has directly encouraged its Partner States to exclude patents on 
“new medical uses of known substances including micro-organisms … .”10  
However, by existing regulation and KIPI Examination Guidelines, new use 
patents are considered to be process patents,11 so these provisions should be 
amended if the Bill is adopted.   
Novelty:  Subsection 49(1) has a standard definition of novelty:  “An 
invention is new if it is not anticipated by prior art.” Kenya appropriately 
adopts a global standard of novelty and includes disclosure that is written, 
oral, or by use, exhibition of other non-written means (subsection 49(2)) 
though it also has a twelve-month “grace” period (subsection 29(5)). Kenya 
also includes prior disclosed patent applications in its definition of prior art 
(subsection 49(4)). This standard is discussed at length in paragraph 6.31 of 
the Examination Guidelines, which clarifies that novelty determinations 
should not be based on combining separate items of prior art together but that 
                                                 
8 Novartis AG v. Union of India and Ors, paras. 180, 187 (2013). 
9 The East African Community has also directly recommended that its Partners States “are to exclude 
from patentability … Derivative of medical products that do not show significantly enhanced 
therapeutic efficacy/significant superior properties.”  EAC REGIONAL IP POLICY, Policy Statement No. 
3(a)(iii), at 14. 
10 EAC REGIONAL IP POLICY, Policy Statement No. 3(a)(ii), at 14.  For EAC Partner States seeking to 
consider new medical uses principally patentable as processes under the patentability criteria (like 
Kenya), the EAC further recommends that they “shall strictly apply the patentability requirements on 
a case-by-case basis.”  This author thinks it is superior to reject new use patents altogether as India has 
done. 
11 Legal Notice 50, THE INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY REGULATIONS, 2002, Section 36, 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=128385. See also Kenya Industrial Property Institute, 
GUIDELINE FOR THE EXAMINATION OF PATENTS, UTILITY MODELS, AND INDUSTRIAL DESIGNS 
[EXAMINATION GUIDELINES], para 6.22 (2007), 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/ke/ke018en.pdf.  
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the disclosure of prior art can be either explicit or implicit.  Limiting prior art 
to a single source goes against the recommendation of the EAC, which 
recommends that EAC Members “Strictly apply the novelty standard through 
considering a wide concept of prior art …, including … information … 
derivable from a combination of publications.”12  In addition, Kenya could 
reject selection claims on Markush patent applications that cover a broad 
range of possible compounds.13  Because the “selected” compounds are in 
fact already disclosed in the Markush claim, they can be excluded from 
patentability.  Alternatively, Kenya could exclude Markush claims as be 
overly broad. 
Inventive step:  Inventive step is often the most important patentability 
criteria with respect to medicines and other health technologies.  Section 50 
of the proposed Bill says:  “An invention shall be considered as involving an 
inventive step if, having regard to the prior art relevant to the application 
claiming the invention, it would not have been obvious to a person skilled in 
the art to which the invention pertains on the date of the filing of the 
application, or, if priority is claimed, on the priority date validly claimed in 
respect thereto.”  It is highly desirable to codify high standards for inventive 
steps.  The Kenyan Examination Guidelines do incorporate relatively high 
standards by (1) acknowledging that with respect to “a person skilled in the 
art,” “There may be instances where it is more appropriate to think in terms 
of a group of persons, e.g., a research or production team, than a single 
person” for example, with advance technologies involving complex chemical 
substances (Paragraph 6.33.2); (2) simple juxtaposition or aggregation of 
known features is not inventive (Paragraph 66.33.5); and (3) it is permissible 
to combine the disclosure of one or more documents, parts of documents or 
other pieces of prior art, to assess inventive step (Paragraph 6.33.11).    
On the negative side, Kenya could assess inventive step by means of a 
higher standard – “a person (or groups of persons) highly skilled in the 
relevant art(s), including persons with some degree of imagination and 
intuition.”14  The EAC specifically recommends that inventive step be defined 
by reference to a person “highly” skilled in the arts.15  This definition would 
acknowledge the special skills of true experts, the distributed nature of 
expertise in modern research ventures, and the growing interdisciplinary of 
research.  The inventive stop standard could also be strengthened by more 
directly acknowledging that prior art can teach indirectly.  In addition, there 
are several undesirable elements in Kenya’s Examination Guidelines, namely 
consideration of long-felt need and commercial success (apparently borrowed 
                                                 
12 EAC REGIONAL IP POLICY, Policy Statement No. 2(a), at 13. 
13 “Markush claims are broadly drafted claims covering a family of a large number (sometimes 
millions) of possible compounds through the definition of a chemical structure with multiple 
functionally equivalent chemical entities allowed in one or more parts of the compound.” Carlos M. 
Correa, TACKLING THE PROLIFERATION OF PATENTS:  HOW TO AVOID UNDUE LIMITATIONS TO 
COMPETITION AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, South Centre Research Paper No. 52, at 4 (2014). 
14 Correa, GUIDELINES FOR THE EXAMINATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS, at 4. 
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from U.S. law) and the granting of selection patents, which merely serve to 
extend patent life for previously disclosed substances. 
Industrial applicability:  Section 51 of the Bill states that “an invention 
shall be considered industrially applicable, if, according to its nature, it can 
be made or used in any kind of industry, including agriculture, medicines, 
fishery and other services.”  This definition is stronger that the concept of 
usefulness or utility adopted by some countries.   One reason to adopt high 
standards of industrial applicability is to ensure that patents are not granted 
on abstract ideas that not concretized in actual technological activity.  
Another reason is to avoid patents on inventions with only ephemeral utility 
is that such patents can block follow-on research by inventors who might 
actually find a practice use for a claimed invention.  Kenya’s definition of 
industrial applicability is relatively strong, but it could be further 
strengthened by adopting the recommendation of the EAC that “the 
patentability of research tools [be limited] to only those for which a specific 
use has been identified.”16 
III.  Disclosures 
Best mode:  The TRIPS Agreement allows countries a great deal of 
flexibility with respect to required disclosures.  Article 29.1 states that the 
applicant may be required “to indicate the best mode for carrying out the 
invention known to the inventor.”  As an improvement to the 2001 Industrial 
Property Act, the proposed Bill, Section 34(5), requires that the description 
of the invention in an application for a patent shall “disclose the invention 
and the best mode for carrying out the invention in such full, clear, concise 
and exact terms as to enable a person skilled in the art to make use and to 
evaluated the invention … .”  An even better requirement, would compel 
disclosure of all known modes for carrying out the invention, including 
identification of the best mode, as recommended by the EAC.17  The failure 
to disclose “the best method for performing the invention known to the owner 
of the patent at the time when the specification was lodged at the Institute” is 
one of the listed grounds for revoking or invalidating a patent in Section 
129(3)(g) of the Bill.   
Material prior art:  The proposed Bill does not currently require the 
patent applicant to disclose known prior art.  The patent applicant is often in 
the best position to ascertain existing art at the time of filing, ordinarily 
having done due diligence on freedom to patent prior to filing the patent 
application.  Capacity-strapped patent examination offices, on the other hand, 
often find it onerous, bordering on impossible, to identify all relevant prior 
art, disclosed by any means, everywhere in the world.  Thus, it makes sense 
for patent legislation to impose a duty on patent applicants to disclose 
relevant prior art.  In an effort to ensure that all relevant prior art is available 
                                                 
16 EAC REGIONAL IP POLICY, Policy Statement No. 2(c), at 13. 
17 EAC REGIONAL IP POLICY, Policy Statement No. 7(a), at 17. 
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to its patent examiners, the US Patents and Trademark Office imposes upon 
the patent applicant a “duty of candour and good faith in dealing with the 
Office, which includes a duty to disclose to the Office all information known 
to that individual to be material to patentability.” An intentional failure to 
disclose all known material prior art is a “fraud upon the [Patents and 
Trademark Office]”, and can result in an invalidation of the patent, and even 
triple damages under US antitrust laws. 
Disclosure of origin:  The proposed Bill does not require disclosure of 
the origin of inventions derived from indigenous biological resources, genetic 
resources, or traditional knowledge or use, nor does it require disclosure of 
means for benefit sharing with respect to the same.  Such a disclosure 
requirement is permissible under TRIPS18 and has been adopted for example 
in South Africa19.  Such a provision reduces biopiracy and misappropriation 
of traditional knowledge. 
Foreign applications: Article 29.2 of the TRIPS Agreement allows 
Member States to require disclosure of foreign patent applications for the 
same invention and to keep the Member State appraised of subsequent grants, 
denials, suspensions, and invalidations.  Instead of requiring such disclosure, 
Section 64(1) of the proposed Bill merely allows the Managing Office to 
request such information.  It would be preferable if these disclosures were 
mandatory.  
International non-proprietary name:  Finally, as recently had been 
proposed in India and as is recommended by the EAC, Kenya could require 
that the patent applicant include the international non-proprietary name for 
any pharmaceutical-related invention.20  This would make it much easier to 
focus examinations of pharmaceutical patents, particularly with respect to 
weak secondary, evergreening patent applications. 
Consequences of non-disclosure – revocation:  At present, the 
consequences of not disclosing required content under Section 129 of the Bill 
is limited to inadequate description of the claim or failure to disclose the best 
known method of performing the invention, and misrepresentation (Section 
129(3)(f), (g) and (h)).  If the additional recommended disclosures discussed 
above are added, failure to provide these disclosures should also result in 
revocation. 
IV. Limitations and Exceptions 
Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement allows for limited exceptions to 
patent rights so long as they “do not unreasonably conflict with a normal 
exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third 
                                                 
18 Carlos Correa & Joshua D. Sarnoff, ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING DISCLOSURE OF ORIGIN 
REQUIREMENTS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY APPLICATIONS, 24 (UNCTAD, 2006). 
19 South Africa Patents Act, sections 3A and 61(g). 
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parties.”  Some of the most important limited exceptions affecting access to 
medicines and other health technologies that Kenya should adopt are 
discussed below. 
Prior use:  Section 82 of the Bill provides a limited exception to patent 
rights for “prior users” who in good faith had used the invention or was 
making effective and serious preparations for such use.  This provision might 
rarely apply in the pharmaceutical context, but it might at least on occasion 
and thus it is a good provision to have in effect and is quite consistent with 
state practice elsewhere. 
Research exception:  Article 84(1) of the Bill creates a limited exception 
for non-commercial or non-industrial scientific research.  This formulation 
does not make full use of the flexibility allows by Article 30 of the TRIPS 
Agreement.  According to WIPO research, many countries have adopted a 
much broader research and education exception that allows both commercial 
and non-commercial research “on or with” the patented product or process 
and likewise allows for education use as well.  The EAC directly recommends 
such an approach.21  Allowing commercial research facilitates the process of 
incremental innovation that might lead to commercialization, including the 
commercialization of dependent technologies.  Allowing research with as 
well as on the patented subject matter allows the researcher to use patented 
upstream research platforms without being bogged down in license 
negotiations.  In this regard, the EAC recommends that EAC Partner States 
patent law “Provide a right to claim a non-exclusive licence for the use of 
patented research tools against the payment of compensation.”22  This right 
could be automatic. 
Early working/Bolar exception:  Kenya has an early working/Bolar 
exception in Section 80(2) of the Bill.23 However, Kenya’s Bolar provision is 
limited in two ways that could be improved.  First, it would seem to allow 
working the patent for the purpose of registration only within Kenya.  Second, 
the exception would seem to be valid only when the registrant confirms that 
it will not commercialize the registered product until after patent expiration.  
TRIPS Article 30 allows research activities and product development 
reasonably related to the purpose of registering or obtaining required 
marketing approvals for pharmaceuticals and other medical products. For 
example, the early working exception allows a producer of medicines to 
reverse engineer a medicine, to conduct stability, bioequivalence and other 
required tests, to develop proof of manufacturing according to Good 
Manufacturing Practice, and thereafter to submit the compiled data to 
national drug regulatory authorities for the purpose of obtaining marketing 
                                                 
21 EAC REGIONAL IP POLICY, Policy Statement No. 4(a), at 15. The EAC notes that “The preponderant 
purpose of commercial research must be the generation of new knowledge of the patented subject.” 
22 EAC REGIONAL IP POLICY, Policy Statement No. 4(b), at 15. 
23 “The rights conferred on the owner of the patent under this section shall not apply to acts by third 
parties necessary to obtain approval or registration of a product from the Institute, for the purpose of 
commercialising the product after expiry of the patent.” 
 PIJIP Research Paper No. 53  
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP 
10
approval.  All these activities can occur before the patent expires so that the 
generic entrant is in a position to quickly enter the market upon patent expiry, 
instead of having to wait two or more years to complete the required research 
and product development and then additional years to obtain regulatory 
approval.  Similarly, if the generic entrant believes that a granted patent on 
the medicine is invalid, as a result of a TRIPS-compliant, but best-practice 
early working exception, the registrant can immediately enter the market 
even before patent expiration.  It is important to note that early working rules 
can and should allow the use of the patent product or process with respect to 
both domestic and foreign registration.  This would, for example, facilitate a 
local producer being able to expand into regional and foreign markets more 
quickly.  The EAC firmly recommends the adoption of a broad Bolar 
exception.24   
Parallel importation:  Article 84(2) of the Bill states:  “The rights under 
the patent shall not extend to acts in respect of articles which have been put 
on the market in Kenya or in any other country or imported into Kenya by 
the owner of the patent or with his express consent.”  This is a very significant 
amendment to the provisions of the 2001 Act, which not include the phrase 
“by the owner of the patent or with his express consent.”  The earlier 
provision has a very conflicted history whereby it was initially adopted, 
subsequently repealed surreptitiously and then later reinstated.25  That 
provision had been further clarified by Clause 37 of the Industrial Property 
Regulations of 2002, which provides that:  “The limitations of rights under a 
patent in section 58(2) of the Act extends to acts in respect of articles that are 
imported from a country where the articles were legitimately put on the 
market.” The impact of this version of the international exhaustion rule, 
recommended by Professor Carlos Correa26 and by the EAC27, is quite 
profound.  It meant that Kenya will not only be allowed to parallel import any 
medicines sold by the originator/patent holder in another country or with its 
consent, if it is cost advantageous to do so, it will also be allowed to import 
products sold by voluntary or compulsory licensees.   
                                                 
24  
In order to allow early market entry for generic producers, EAC Partner States shall amend their 
national patent law provisions on marketing approval/‘Bolar’ exception to: 
a.  Authorise the use of patented substances by interested parties for marketing approvals by 
national and foreign medicines regulatory authorities; 
b. Clarify the scope of the marketing approval/‘Bolar’ exception to the effect that generic 
producers may use patented substances for acts ‘reasonably related’ to the development and 
submission of information required for marketing approvals.” 
EAC REGIONAL IP POLICY, Policy Statement No. 5, p. 15-16. 
25 The amendment that was inexplicably incorporated into the law would have been the more common 
international exhaustion rule that would have added the phrase “by the owner of the patent or with his 
express consent.”  This would have resulted in a much less robust parallel importation rule that would 
have prevented, for example, importation of medicines produced pursuant to a properly issued 
compulsory license.  For a brief history of this provision, see Lewis-Lettington & Munyi, at 17-20. 
26 See Correa, INTEGRATING PUBLIC HEALTH, at 79-80 (admitting that such a rule might be subject to 
WTO challenge). 
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For reasons that are unclear, the proposed Bill has adopted the more 
common, but less permissive international exhaustion/parallel importation 
rule, which will therefore require an amendment to the Industrial Property 
Regulations of 2002.  Although this statutory and regulatory change would 
eliminate the risk of a TRIPS compliance challenge, it also means that Kenya 
will have fewer options to import generic equivalents lawfully produced 
abroad.  Accordingly, it might need to increase its use of compulsory or 
government use licenses to overcome patent barriers to source medicines.  
Unfortunately, foreign compulsory licensees do not have untrammeled rights 
to export wherever they want.  Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement still 
places restrictions on the export of medicines produced pursuant to a 
compulsory license, limiting such exports to non-predominant quantities 
except with respect to competition-based licenses (see Article 31(k)).  
Similarly, parallel exportation/importation will not work automatically with 
respect to export licenses granted under the August 30 Decision waiver 
mechanism because of requirements about notification and the requirement 
of a compulsory license in the importing country if a local patent is in effect 
therein.   
Other Exceptions:  Section 84(3) of the proposed Bill confirms an 
exception for the use of patented articles in aircrafts, land vehicles or vessels 
of other countries temporarily in the airspace, territory or waters of Kenya.  
Section 84(5) clarifies that compulsory licenses for reasons of public interest 
or based on interdependence of patents and by the provisions on State 
exploitation of patented inventions are exceptions to patent protections.  
Finally, Section 84(6) states that patent rights “shall not extend to variants or 
mutants of living forms or replicable living matter that is distinctively 
different from the original for which patents were obtained where such 
mutual or variant are deserving of separate patents.” 
V. Required Patent Examinations 
Section 70(3) of the proposed Bill would amend 44(1)(a) of the 2001 Act 
to require examination of patent applications.  
VI. Pre- and Post-Grant Oppositions 
Post-grant:  Kenya’s proposed Bill adopts a form of post-grant opposition 
in Section 129(1) of the Bill, which provides that “An interested person may 
institute proceedings against the owner of a patent or a registered utility 
model or industrial design request[ing] the Tribunal to revoke or invalidate 
the [same].”  The Bill removes a nine-months limitation requirement in the 
2001 Act.  This recourse to administrative proceedings is far superior to more 
costly and time-consuming judicial resolution, especially where the Tribunal 
can develop IP expertise over time.  
Pre-grant:  Unfortunately, Kenya makes no similar provision for pre-
grant opposition, though allowing such procedures is somewhat impractical 
under current ARIPO procedures, which require notification of non-
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acceptance within six months of the grant of an ARIPO patent.  Nonetheless, 
Kenya could adopt pre-grant opposition procedures and bypass ARIPO 
strictures and timelines by automatically denying pharmaceutical (or other) 
patents when a pre-grant opposition has been filed.  This would provide the 
KIPI with plenty of time to carefully consider opposition evidence and 
arguments. 
Low- and middle-income countries frequently face critical capacity 
constraints when examining patent applications, especially in highly 
technical fields of technology.  If patent examiners are undertrained or 
overburdened or if they lack access to prior art databases and other labor 
saving information technologies, then the predictable outcome is patents of 
poor quality – unwarranted patents that nonetheless grant exclusive rights and 
prevent competition. To help alleviate the problem of over-stretched patent 
offices and to ensure consideration of all relevant prior art and the correct 
application of patent eligibility and disclosure standards, multiple countries, 
developed and developing, have allowed pre-grant opposition procedures that 
allow presentation of both evidence and legal arguments.  The EAC has 
recommended that its Partner States provide “for effective pre- and post-grant 
administrative patent application procedures” and that they should further, as 
ARIPO Members, discuss an amendment to the Harare Protocol “to take 
account of third party oppositions” and to allow a longer time within which 
to file written approval of ARIPO granted patents.28 
An effective pre-grant opposition procedure would:   
 Require publication of pending patent applications prior to 
examination and make such applications available online on a 
fully searchable database; 
 Allow for any natural or juristic person, even if acting solely in 
the public interest, to file a pre-grant opposition at any time after 
publication of the patent application but prior to the grant of a 
patent, with ample time for opponents to submit relevant 
evidence; 
 Establish broad grounds for opposition including a failure to meet 
patentable subject matter, exclusion, or patentability criteria and 
failure to make required disclosures; 
 Opponents should be given full legal standing and they should be 
able to appear at a hearing in support of their opposition if such 
hearings are provided for; 
 The pre-grant opposition procedure should allow simple and 
expedited administrative procedures. 
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VII. Compulsory licenses and government use 
Compulsory licenses:  As clarified by the Doha Declaration, WTO 
Members have complete freedom to determine the grounds upon which 
compulsory licenses may be granted.  There are no disease restrictions, 
country-status restrictions, or field of technology restrictions.  The Paris 
Convention29 does place some limits on the timing of compulsory licenses for 
non-working, but otherwise countries have near total discretion to define 
permitted grounds for issuing compulsory licenses.  As a general rule, 
countries are far better off articulating multiple and broad grounds for 
compulsory licenses instead of restricted grounds.30 After all, a patent is a 
sovereign grant of exclusive, i.e., monopoly, rights and the patentee takes 
such rights with full notice of possibility that the granting government might 
issue compulsory and government-use licenses.  Countries should retain 
maximum policy space for the exercise of government discretion about the 
myriad circumstances where involuntary use should be permitted to 
safeguard public interests.   
Kenya’s proposed IP Bill regulates the granting of compulsory licenses 
in sections 97-78 of the Bill.  Sections 97 and 98 provide regrettably limited 
grounds for granting a patent, that must be improved.  Section 97(1) provides 
for compulsory licenses when the patented invention “is not being supplied 
on reasonable terms to Kenya,” but the applicant must wait four years from 
the date of application or three years from the grant of the patent, whichever 
is later, before seeking a compulsory license.  This waiting period is enacted 
in part to comply with Article 5A(4) of the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property, which technically applies only in the case 
of failure to work or insufficient working.  However, the Kenyan provision 
is broader by virtue of requiring supply on reasonable terms, but it also 
needlessly requires an over-long waiting period whenever the patented 
invention is not being supplied on reasonable terms even though it is being 
worked in Kenya, e.g., when prices are excessive, where there are refusals to 
license, etc.  Section 98(1) of the Bill is also unnecessarily limited in that it 
applies only to the granting of dependent patents – patents needed to work a 
                                                 
29 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (1883 as amended through 1979), Article 
5A(4), “A compulsory license may not be applied for on the ground of failure to work or insufficient 
working before the expiration of a period of four years from the date of filing of the patent application 
or three years from the date of the grant of the patent, whichever period expires last; it shall be refused 
if the patentee justifies his inaction by legitimate reasons. Such a compulsory license shall be non-
exclusive and shall not be transferable, even in the form of the grant of a sub-license, except with that 
part of the enterprise or goodwill which exploits such license.”  Available at 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/text.jsp?file_id=288514.  
30 Brook K. Baker, PROCESSES AND ISSUES FOR IMPROVING ACCESS TO MEDICINES:  WILLINGNESS AND 
ABILITY TO UTILIZE TRIPS FLEXIBILITIES IN NON-PRODUCING COUNTRIES, UK DFID, Health Systems 
Resource Centre (2004); Cecilia Oh, Compulsory licenses:  recent experiences in developing countries, 
1 INT’L J. INTELLECTUAL PROP. 22-36 (2006); Jerome H. Reichman & Catherine Hasenzahl, NON-
VOLUNTARY LICENSING OF PATENTED INVENTIONS:  HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
UNDER TRIPS, AND AN OVERVIEW OF THE PRACTICE IN CANADA AND THE USA (2003); Reed Beall & 
Randall Kuhn, Trends in Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Since the Doha Declaration:  A 
Database Analysis, 9:1 PLOS MED e1001154 (2012). 
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new invention that constitutes an important technical advance of considerable 
economic significance in relation to the invention claimed in the earlier 
patent.  This dependent-patent exception is directly authorized by TRIPS 
Article 31(l).  However, there is nothing in TRIPS that prohibits a compulsory 
license for the working of a dependent technology even if that technology is 
not patented. 
The permissible grounds for compulsory licensing in Kenya is capable of 
broad interpretation, but could still be improved.  As stated above, the Doha 
Declaration reaffirms that countries are free to determine the grounds upon 
which licenses might be granted.31  This freedom further emphasized by the 
EAC.32  Common grounds include unreasonable pricing, emergencies and 
matters of extreme urgency, and refusals to license.  However, it is highly 
desirable to list addition specific grounds, e.g., to prevent the risk of stock-
outs, to promote the development and marketing of rational fixed-dose 
combinations, and to protect public health and the public interest more 
broadly.  Indeed, although this proposition is not without some controversy,33 
there is scope under Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement to permit compulsory 
licenses for failure to work the patented invention locally within Kenya by 
manufacturing or using the process in Kenya,34 much as both Brazil and India 
have done.  The Paris Convention in Article 5A(2) directly authorizes 
countries of the Union to provide for compulsory licenses in case of failure 
by the patentee to work the patent locally (e.g. to produce locally, rather than 
merely import). Such a provision as this would certainly be a boon to local 
and regional production of medicines.   
Similarly, Kenya should provide for competition-based compulsory 
licenses as recommended by the EAC.35  It has done so with respect to 
government use licenses (Section 105(1)(b)), but it could also do so for 
revised Section 97 licenses.  If it does so, it should take advantage of 
additional flexibilities removing the requirement of prior negotiation and 
limits of quantities exported (TRIPS Article 31(k)).  In order to speed up its 
access to medicines even in the pre-grant stage where a pending patent can 
operated as a de facto patent in terms of deterring competition, Kenya should 
provide for tentative or provisional compulsory licenses on medicines with 
pending patents and when denied patents are under appeal.  These licenses 
                                                 
31 Doha Declaration, para. 5(b), “Each member has the right to grant compulsory licences and the 
freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licences are granted.” 
32 EAC REGIONAL IP POLICY, Policy Statement No. 10(a), at 20. 
33 Those who argue against the legality of local working requirements often point to Article 27.1 of the 
TRIPS Agreement which prohibits discrimination against imports in the granting patents available or 
enjoyment of patent rights.  
34 Michael Halewood, Regulating Patent Holders:  Local Working Requirement and Compulsory 
Licenses at International Law, 35 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 243-287  (1997); Bryan Mercuriio & Mitali 
Tyagi, Treaty Interpretation in WTO Dispute Settlement:  The Outstanding Question of the Legality of 
Local Working Requirements, 19 MINN. J. INT’L L. 275-326 (2010); Chia-Ling Lee, The Legality of 
Local Patent Working Requirements under the TRIPS Agreement, 2 N.T.U.T. J. of Intell. Prop. L. & 
Mgmt. 39-48 (2013); Paul Champ and Amir Attaran, Patent Rights and Local Working Under the WTO 
TRIPS Agreement:  An Analysis of the Brazil Patent Dispute, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 365-293 (2002). 
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could be royalty free with a catch-up payment if the patent is ultimately 
granted.  Finally, Kenya could take the bold step of allowing compulsory 
licenses for know-how.  In many instances, a patent can best be 
operationalized only via access to otherwise trade-secret know-how.  Based 
on additional compensation a license could be imposed granting involuntary 
access to the same.36 
Kenya has comprehensively incorporated the required procedures of the 
TRIPS compulsory licenses in the proposed Bill.  Nonetheless, there are other 
elements of the compulsory licensing regime that could be improved.  For 
example, Kenya should directly reference the right to supply a compulsory 
license via importation.  With a wise amendment to the 2001 Act, Kenya has 
explicitly waived the requirement for prior negotiation in cases of national 
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency regardless of whether 
the license is premised initially on non-working under section 99(2) of the 
proposed Bill as recommended by the EAC.37  To speed up the issuance of 
compulsory licenses it could specify the minimum time period for prior 
negotiation for a voluntary license on commercially reasonable terms, e.g., 
the 90-days only recommended by the EAC.38  Kenya could also follow the 
best practice recommendation that it set remuneration guidelines to simplify 
the determination of adequate remuneration.39  In this regard, the EAC has 
recommended that Partner States shall “include in their patent laws a 
provision statement stating that the remuneration shall not exceed the UNDP 
recommended figure of 4%, and take anti-competitive behaviour into account 
when determining the amount of remuneration.”40 
Article 31bis licenses:  A fundamental flaw in the Article 31(f) of the 
TRIPS Agreement is that it limits exportation of goods produced pursuant to 
a compulsory licenses to non-predominate quantities.  This provision creates 
a serious disadvantage for countries that have insufficient capacity to 
manufacturer medicines locally or where it is inefficient to do so, and who 
must therefore rely on imports.  In such instances, governments could issue 
an “ordinary” compulsory license to a foreign company, but, if there were 
also an applicable patent in the country of production/export, then a 
compulsory license would have to be issued in that country as well.  The 
Article 31(f) paradox is that the licensed exporting company might not be 
able to export sufficient quantities to fulfill foreign needs because of the 
“predominately for domestic use” rule. 
The drafters of the Doha Declaration recognized this dilemma and 
instructed the WTO to devise an expeditious decision in paragraph 6 of the 
                                                 
36 Max Planck Institute, DECLARATION ON PATENT PROTECTION:  REGULATORY SOVEREIGNTY UNDER 
TRIPS, at 11 (2014), available at http://www.mpg.de/8133454/Patent-Declaration1.pdf.  
37 EAC REGIONAL IP POLICY, Policy Statement No. 10(g), at 20. 
38 EAC REGIONAL IP POLICY, Policy Statement No. 10(f), at 20. 
39 See James Love, REMUNERATION GUIDELINES FOR NON-VOLUNTARY USE OF A PATENT ON MEDICAL 
TECHNOLOGIES, UNDP and WHO (2005) at pp. 67–76 for a comprehensive review of proposed 
remuneration guidelines. 
40 EAC REGIONAL IP POLICY, Policy Statement No. 10(e), at 20. 
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Declaration.  Belatedly, on 30 August 2003 the WTO General Council issued 
a decision declaring a waiver from Article 31(f), the so-called Paragraph 6 
Decision.41 After long delays, the TRIPS Agreement is now amended to add 
Article 31bis now codifying the earlier Decision. Unfortunately, Article 31bis 
imposes considerable procedural requirements on both importing and 
exporting countries issuing compulsory licenses and further restricts the 
quantity of pharmaceutical products that might be exported.  These 
procedural requirements have been called “labyrinth”42 and as being “neither 
expeditious, nor a solution.”43  Nonetheless, Kenya should amend its 
compulsory licensing regime to allow use of Article 31bis as both an 
importing and exporting country.  The EAC has certainly recommended that 
Partner States do so.44  In doing so, it should follow innovative suggestions 
for simplifying domestic implementation of the Article 31bis, including a so-
called one-license solution that was proposed in Canada but allowed to lapse 
in Parliament.45   
Government use:  Kenya has adopted a much more progressive grounds 
allowing for government use.  The grounds articulated in Section 105(1)(a) 
are quite broad, including the “public interest” generally and more 
particularly “national security, nutrition, health, environmental conservation, 
or the development of any other vital sector of the national economy.”  
Section 105(1)(b) also allows government use licenses where the Director 
General determines that the manner of exploiting the patent is not 
competitive.  The government use can be ordered “by the Cabinet Secretary” 
and shall allow exploitation of the protected invention by a Government 
Ministry, Department, agency or other person (Section 105(1)).  The 
Procedures for issuing a government-use order are clarified in Regulation 43 
of the Industrial Property Regulations, namely a request that the Minister act.   
                                                 
41 Decision of the General Council of 30 August 2003, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 and Corr.1, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm. The “temporary waiver” of the 
Decision was made into a permanent proposed amendment to TRIPS in December 2005, under a new 
Article 31bis, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/wtl641_e.htm. The amendment 
will become part of TRIPS only upon ratification by at least two-thirds of the WTO members. At 
present, less than half of all WTO members had ratified the amendment. 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/amendment_e.htm.  
42 Brook K. Baker, Arthritic Flexibilities for Accessing Medicines, Analysis of WTO Action Regarding 
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 14 IND. INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 613-715 (2004); Frederick M. Abbott & Jerome H. Reichman, The Doha Round’s Public 
Health Legacy:  Strategies for the Production and Diffusion of Patented Medicines under the Amended 
TRIPS Provision, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 921-987 (2007); Frederick M. Abbott, The WTO Medicines 
Decision:  World Pharmaceutical Trade and the Protection of Public Health, 99 AM. J. INT’L L 317 
(2005). 
43 Medecins Sans Frontieres Canada, NEITHER EXPEDITIOUS, NOR A SOLUTION: THE WTO AUGUST 30 
DECISION IS UNWORKABLE, 2 (2006). 
44 EAC REGIONAL IP POLICY, supra note 5, Policy Statement No. 10(b)-(d), at 20. 
45 Richard Elliott, Fixing Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime – Bill C-398, IP-WATCH (18 Nov. 
2012), available at http://www.ip-watch.org/2012/11/18/fixing-canadas-access-to-medicines-regime-
bill-c-398/; Bill C-398 available at 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&DocId=5391829
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Government use explicitly allows for satisfaction by importation as well 
as by local production (Section 105(2)).  There are conflicting provisions on 
adequate remuneration.  Subsections 105(1) and (8) require adequate 
compensation whereas Subsections 105(3) and (4) do not require payment of 
compensation, which would run afoul of the adequate remuneration 
requirements of Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
The Bill could be improved if it clarified that the Department could act 
sua sponte to allow use by or for the government.  The United States has an 
extremely liberal government use provision requiring no formalities 
whatsoever.  Section 105 of the Bill requires prior negotiation with the patent 
owner for a contractual license except in the case of national emergency or 
other extreme urgency. The requirement of prior negotiations for government 
use license is clearly TRIPS-plus and should be rejected.  Governments are 
not required by TRIPS Article 31 to consult with patent owners for public, 
non-commercial use let alone try to negotiate a contractual license allowing 
government use. Likewise, the Bill fails to provide for remuneration 
guidelines, as discussed above, and it fails to exclude injunctive relief as a 
remedy with respect to government use licenses as recommended by the 
EAC.46 Finally, it would be preferable if Section 105 more directly referenced 
that the government use were for “public, non-commercial use” as specified 
in Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
VIII. Regulation of contractual licenses:   
WTO Member States are fully empowered under international law to 
closely regulate the terms of intellectual property licenses to prevent 
anticompetitive terms.  TRIPS Article 8(2) clarifies that:  “Appropriate 
measures, provided they are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement, 
may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right 
holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or 
adversely affect the international transfer of technology.”  More particularly, 
TRIPS Article 40.2 states that Members may specify in their domestic laws 
licensing practices or conditions "that may in particular cases constitute an 
abuse of intellectual property rights having an adverse effect on competition 
in the relevant market."  It also specifies some presumptively anti-
competitive practices.47  The East Africa Community directs its Partner States 
                                                 
46 EAC REGIONAL IP POLICY, Policy Statement No. 10(h), at 20. 
47 TRIPS Article 40:   
1. Members agree that some licensing practices or conditions pertaining to intellectual property 
rights which restrain competition may have adverse effects on trade and may impede the 
transfer and dissemination of technology. 
2. Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent Members from specifying in their legislation 
licensing practices or conditions that may in particular cases constitute an abuse of 
intellectual property rights having an adverse effect on competition in the relevant market. 
As provided above, a Member may adopt, consistently with the other provisions of this 
Agreement, appropriate measures to prevent or control such practices, which may include 
for example exclusive grantback conditions, conditions preventing challenges to validity and 
coercive package licensing, in the light of the relevant laws and regulations of that Member. 
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to prevent anti-competitive behavior and to list licensing terms that may be 
considered unjustified restrictions on competition and authorize patent 
registrars to refuse to register such licensing contracts.48 
Kenya has adopted extensive rules regulating contractual licenses in 
Sections 90-96 of the Bill.  Contractual terms prohibited are listed in Section 
94 of the Bill.  Section 94’s general prohibition is against clauses that impose 
unjustified restriction on the licensee with the consequence that the contract, 
taken as a whole, is harmful to the economic interest of Kenya, if those 
clauses also require, among others: (i) importation of technologies obtainable 
on the same terms within Kenya, (ii) disproportion prices or royalties 
compared to the value of the technology, (iii) acquisition of materials from 
the licensor or other limited source other than to ensure quality, (iv) limits on 
eligible buyers, (v) grant back rights without consideration, (vi) volume 
limitation and exports prohibitions, (vii) prohibitions on use of other 
technologies, (viii) fixed prices, (ix) waivers of liability, (x) restricted use 
after the expiration of the contract, (xi) choice of non-Kenya law, (xii) 
unreasonably long periods, (xiii) non-adaptation to local conditions, (xiv) 
mandatory tie-ins or requirements to accept additional technologies and 
future improvements, and/or many other prohibited conditions including 
royalties on patents outside of Kenya (double royalties).  At this point, it 
would be better for Kenya to actually enforce its supervision of contractual 
licenses rather than to seek amendment to its current comprehensive rules.  
IX. Enforcement 
Injunctions:  In terms of enforcing patent rights, Section 81(1)(a) of the 
Bill allows patent holders to obtain injunctions to restrain patent infringement 
and Section 132(a) states that the Tribunal “shall grant … an injunction to 
prevent infringement where infringement is imminent or to prohibit the 
continuation of the infringement, once infringement has started,” whereas 
Article 44 of the TRIPS Agreement allows countries freedom to allow 
compensation only – essentially a judicially issued license.49  Such an 
allowance has been used in the United States50 and in India51.   
Provisional Protection:  Section 77 the Bill grants TRIPS plus rights to 
claim compensation for offending acts during the pendency of the application 
                                                 
48 EAC REGIONAL IP POLICY, Policy Statement No. 11(a), at 20-21. 
49 The legality of such a limitation on injunctive and provisional relief under TRIPS is clarified by 
Article 44.2 of the TRIPS Agreement, “In other cases, the remedies under this Part shall apply or, where 
these remedies are inconsistent with a Member’s law, declaratory judgments and adequate 
compensation shall be available (emphasis added).” 
50 eBay, Inc., v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
51 See Hoffman La Roche v. Cipla & Anr, IA No. 642/2008 in CS (OS) No.89/2008.  The refusal to 
grant a preliminary injunction was vindicated by an eventual trial on the merits in 2012 where it was 
found that Cipla had not in fact violated the patent at issue.  Elsewhere, the Supreme Court of Appeal 
in South Africa has recently ruled that the impact on a temporary injunction on the public interest 
should be weighed before entering such an order, but on the merits of the case rejected awarding a 
royalty and instead awarded the temporary order.  Cipla Medpro v. Aventis Pharma; Aventis Pharma 
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for a patent, if the application has been published in English under the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty or if the offender received written notice in English about 
the published application.  This provision requires compensation even with 
respect to a patent application that is subsequently denied with no subsequent 
recourse against the unsuccessful patent applicant. This provision is TRIPS-
plus and should be rejected.  Section 81 of the Bill also allows compensation 
for infringement following publication of an application, as if the patent had 
been granted where the alleged infringer had actual knowledge that the 
invention he was using was the subject matter of a published application or 
he had received written notice of the same.  
Criminal enforcement:  In addition to unnecessarily requiring injunctions, 
the Bill in Section 135 undesirably provides for criminal sanctions for 
intention violations of patents, utility models, or industrial designs, including 
up to five years of imprisonment.  The TRIPS Agreement does not require 
criminal enforcement of IP rights, except in the narrow context of criminal 
trademark infringement and copyright piracy on a commercial scale.52 
Whether a patent right is violated by a particular act is often a question of 
refined judicial interpretation.  Producers of alleged patent infringing 
products might well assume that their acts will not be infringing, they may be 
ignorant of the patent claim in issue, or they may sincerely believe that the 
asserted patent is invalid and that they would win any infringement case.  In 
the face of inherent uncertainty about patent validity and enforceability and 
in light of the negative impact of criminal sanctions on innovation activity, it 
is simply inappropriate to impose criminal liability on a party for infringing 
a patent,53 especially because other remedies are available including damages 
and in extraordinary cases injunctive relief.  This provision should be 
rejected. 
X. Utility Models 
Utility models are essentially lesser patents on minor innovations that fall 
short of meeting patentability criteria, usually novelty or inventive step.  In 
addition to having lesser standards, utility model systems, including Kenya’s, 
typically do not require substantive examination of the merits of the 
application.54  Under Article 107(1) of its Bill, Kenya legislates that “An 
invention qualifies for a utility model certificate if it is new and industrially 
applicable.”  This Review concludes that Kenya should deny utility models 
                                                 
52 Article 61. 
53 See, Irina C. Manta, The Puzzle of Criminal Sanctions for Intellectual Property Infringement, 24 
HARVARD J. LAW & TECH. 469-518 (2011); Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Innovation 
and Incarceration:  An Economic Analysis of Criminal Intellectual Property, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 275-
334 (2014) (“According to our analysis, there is a limited and tentative case for the use of criminal 
liability, including imprisonment and alternative sanctions, for only some types of copyright 
infringement—and none at all for patent infringement”); Max Planck Institute, DECLARATION ON 
PATENT PROTECTION, at 12. 
54 Uma Suthersanen, UTILITY MODELS AND INNOVATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, UNCTAD-ICTSD 
(2006); Draft Amended Patents Act, Article 101.  
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on pharmaceuticals.55  The vast majority of utility models on 
pharmaceuticals, including biodiversity-based and traditional-knowledge-
based medicines, are likely be filed by foreign pharmaceutical companies. 
Accordingly, utility models based on minor variations in formulations, 
dosages, or chemical form, instead of aiding local pharmaceutical 
manufacture, would serve instead primarily to delay generic competition and 
to raise the cost of needed medicines.  Because the TRIPS Agreement does 
not require utility models, it is possible to distinguish between fields of 
technologies therein.  Although the EAC does not go so far as to recommend 
that there not be any protection for small-scale innovations, it suggests that 




Although there are many positive elements in patent sections of the 
proposed Intellectual Property Bill, 2020, there are many additional TRIPS-
compliant provisions that should be included. There is little point in 
recodifying existing law, only to fall short in adopting provisions that can go 
as far as legally permissible to ensure increased access to affordable health 
products in Kenya, especially as it faces the COVID-19 pandemic.  The 
recommended additions and changes are neither radical nor controversial.  
They are common sense adjustments that will help conserve public and 
private resources while limiting or curtailing excessive monopoly control by 
multinational biopharmaceutical companies over life-saving medicines. 
 
                                                 
55 “The utility model law should comprise a detailed list of excluded subject matter which must mirror 
the exclusions under the patent law. Moreover, it is worth considering excluding some types of 
invention as dictated by public policy such as chemicals or pharmaceuticals or biological material or 
substances or processes.”  Suthersanen, at 38. Japan, Korea, and Italy among others exclude utility 
models on chemical compositions and/or pharmaceuticals directly. 
56 EAC REGIONAL IP POLICY, Policy Statement No. 3(b), at 14. 
